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  • General James Longstreet's Witness Tree Magnifying Glass
  • General James Longstreet's Witness Tree Magnifying Glass
  • General James Longstreet's Witness Tree Magnifying Glass
  • General James Longstreet's Witness Tree Magnifying Glass
  • General James Longstreet's Witness Tree Magnifying Glass
  • General James Longstreet's Witness Tree Magnifying Glass
  • General James Longstreet's Witness Tree Magnifying Glass
SKU: WT-116

General James Longstreet's Witness Tree Magnifying Glass

$65.00Price

Longstreet's actions at the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg would become the centerpiece of lasting controversy. He arrived on the battlefield at about 4:30 on the afternoon of the first day, July 1, 1863, hours ahead of his troops. Commanding General Robert E. Lee had not intended to fight before his army was fully concentrated, but chance and decisions by Confederate General A.P. Hill, whose troops were the first to be engaged, brought on the confrontation. The battle on the first day was a strong Confederate victory. Two Union corps were driven from their positions north of Gettysburg back through the town into defensive positions. Meeting with Lee, Longstreet was concerned about the strength of the Union defensive position on elevated ground and advocated a strategic movement around the left flank of the enemy which would presumably compel Union General Meade to attack defensive positions erected by the Confederates. Instead, Lee exclaimed, "If the enemy is there tomorrow, I will attack him." Longstreet replied, "If he is there tomorrow it is because he wants you to attack." Lee, energized by the success of his army that day, refused. Longstreet suggested an immediate assault on the federal positions, but Lee insisted on waiting for more troops, who were marching towards Gettysburg on the Chambersburg Pike. Lee's plan for July 2 called for Longstreet to attack the Union's left ank, to be followed up by Hill's attack on the center, while General Ewell demonstrated on the Union right. Longstreet again argued for a flanking maneuver around the Union left and set a defensive position, but Lee rejected his plan. Longstreet was not ready to attack as early as Lee envisioned. He received permission from Lee to wait for General Hood's division to reach the eld before advancing. The Confederates marched quickly, but did not arrive until the afternoon. While Lee expected an attack around noon, Longstreet was not ready until 4 P.M. Union General Meade used the time to bring more of his troops forward to strengthen his defensive position on superior ground. Once the assault began, Longstreet pressed his men strongly against heavy Union resistance. Longstreet personally led the attack on horseback. The Confederates were eventually repulsed after encountering resistance. The Confederates attempted to take Little Round Top, a hill on the far left of the Union lines. The hill had originally been without troops before Union Brigadier General Gouverneur K. Warren sent soldiers to fortify it. Confederate troops took the part of the

hill known as Devil's Den, but were unable to drive off Union forces situated at the top. The attacks had failed, and Longstreet's corps suffered more than 4,000 casualties. Contributing to Longstreet's failure was the fact that his attacks did not occur simultaneously with other commands. Large portions of troops who had seen significant action the day before, were unengaged, and Meade was able to command the field with his considerable advantage.

Source: Wikipedia_https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Longstreet

  • The wood used to create this product is guaranteed to be from pieces legally acquired from the mighty oak tree that witnessed the formation of General Longstreet’s troops as they prepared for the assaults on the Peach Orchard, the Wheatfield and the Round Tops on July 2, 1863.

  • Available without engraving.

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